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THE EXPORT PERFORMANCE OF EMERGING ECONOMY FIRMS: THE 
INFLUENCE OF FIRM CAPABILITIES AND INSTITUTIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTS 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We advance a two-stage theoretical model which contends that the export performance of 
emerging economy firms (EEFs) will depend both upon their firm-specific capabilities 
and their home institutional environments. Specifically, we argue that EEFs will be more 
likely to export when facing more uncertainty at home from greater political instability, 
substantial informal competition, and high corruption. Furthermore, we hypothesize that 
firms’ export intensities will be contingent upon specialized internal capabilities such as a 
skilled workforce, top managerial experience, and access to external technologies. We 
test these hypotheses using a dataset of more than 16,000 firms from the four BRIC 
economies (i.e., Brazil, Russia, China and India). Our results confirm that political 
instability and informal competition have robust effects on the export propensity of EEFs, 
whilst export intensity is contingent upon the availability of skilled workers and access to 
external technologies via licensing. 
 
 
 
Keywords:  Emerging economy firms; Export performance; Firm capabilities;  
Institutions; Heckman selection.
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The world economy has undergone significant changes in recent decades in response to 
major market and trade liberalization initiatives in many countries, with increasing numbers of 
firms embracing international expansion through exports (Buckley & Strange, 2015). Given this 
surge, many scholarly investigations have examined exporting activities, focusing in particular 
on firms from developed economies and host-country characteristics (for reviews see Zou & 
Stan, 1998; Sousa, Martinez-Lopez, & Coelho, 2008; Bernard, Jensen, Redding, & Schott, 
2007).  
Although recent additions to this literature (Yi, Wang & Kafouros, 2013; Gaur, Kumar, 
& Singh, 2014; Agnihotra & Bhattacharya, 2015) have begun to focus on emerging economy 
firms (EEFs) and contextual factors, our knowledge in these areas remains limited. Specifically, 
prior theoretical rationales that apply to exporters from developed countries might be unsuited to 
examine EEF strategies and behaviours (Wright, Filatotchev, Hoskisson & Peng, 2005). 
Furthermore, prior export research tends to focus on various host-country characteristics, while 
paying less attention to features of the exporters’ home countries (Sousa et al., 2008). 
Particularly in the emerging economy (EE) context, these characteristics may include critical 
factors (e.g., political instability, informal competitors, etc.) which are typically not considered in 
studies of firms from developed economies (McCann & Bahl, 2016; Hiatt & Sine, 2014; Gokalp, 
Lee & Peng, 2017). Finally, firm exporting is a complex activity, comprising multiple layers of 
decisions (e.g., whether, where, what, and how much) that are governed by different 
determinants (Bernard et al., 2011). While most studies focus solely on one of these aspects, it is 
important to understand the interplay between these distinct dimensions under different 
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institutional and capability configurations (Gao, Murray, Kotabe & Lu, 2010). 
We seek to address these issues and enhance our understanding of EEF exports by 
employing elements from the institution-based view (IBV) and the resource-based view (RBV) 
of the firm (Estrin, Meyer, Wright, & Foliano, 2008). Our research questions are twofold: what 
institutional features in emerging economies affect EEFs’ likelihood of becoming exporters (i.e., 
export propensity), and which firm capabilities determine their subsequent success (i.e., export 
intensity)? Among the many elements of the institutional environment and a wide array of firm 
capabilities, we focus on several prominent, but relatively unexplored, features in the extant 
literature. Accordingly, we develop six hypotheses, and test them empirically using data on more 
than 16,000 EEFs from the four BRIC economies (i.e. Brazil, Russia, India, and China). 
Together, these four economies account for nearly one fifth of world exports and their share has 
been steadily increasing over the last decades (WTO, 2015).  
We contribute to the literature in two important ways. First, we advance our 
understanding of EEFs’ export determinants by proposing a two-stage theoretical model that 
encompasses the two main dimensions of export performance, namely propensity and intensity. 
Compared to past research that addressed these questions in isolation, we adopt an integrative 
approach that allows us to study them in conjunction, while paying attention to their different 
determinants. We argue that weak home-country institutions provide a ‘push’ to EEFs to seek 
out overseas markets (Witt & Lewin, 2007; Cuervo-Cazurra, Narula & Un, 2015; Luiz, 
Stringfellow & Jefthas, 2017), thereby determining their export propensity. In this way, 
exporting presents a potential escape route for EEFs to avoid the “institutional misalignment” 
(Witt & Lewin, 2007: 582) between internal needs and domestic institutional constraints. 
However, such an escape motivation does not warrant success abroad, hence we do not expect 
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institutional variables to explain variations in the export intensities of EEFs. To understand the 
latter, we focus on EEF heterogeneity, and in particular on differing levels of key firm-specific 
capabilities. Thus, an EEF’s relative export success vis-à-vis its competitors will ultimately 
depend on its existing capabilities and its ability to mobilize them effectively (Singh, 2009). 
Subsequently, our empirical analysis follows this theoretical reasoning and employs a two-stage 
Heckman procedure, in which we model export propensity (i.e. whether or not firms export) as 
inter alia function of the home-country institutions, and then model export intensity (i.e. the 
value of the export/sales ratio) as inter alia function of firm key capabilities.  
Second, we contribute by developing IBV (Peng, Wang, & Jiang, 2008) and RBV 
(Barney, 1991) explanations that are specific to emerging markets (EEs). Both institutional 
environments (Gaur et al., 2014) and internal capabilities (Yiu, Lau, & Bruton, 2007; Wang, 
Cao, Zhou & Ning, 2013) of EEFs are very different from those of developed economy firms, 
thus presenting the former with unique challenges. To explore these idiosyncrasies we focus on 
three key institutional aspects (i.e., informal competition, corruption, and political instability) 
and their effect on export propensity (Arráiz, Henriquez, & Stucchi, 2013; Schneider & Enste, 
2000; Lee & Weng, 2013).  Moreover, given EEFs’ challenges in terms of securing traditional 
resources (Gaur et al., 2014), we examine how the workers’ skill level (Ganotakis & Love, 
2012), access to external technologies (Yassar & Paul, 2007) and top management experience 
(Sapienza et al., 2006) affect their export intensity. In these ways, we are able to augment 
existing literature by showcasing the joint importance of institutional contingencies and firm 
capabilities for export performance. 
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THEORY AND HYPOTHESES  
Determinants of Export Performance 
There are several extensive reviews on determinants of export performance (see, for 
instance, Chetty & Hamilton, 1993; Zou & Stan, 1998; Sousa et al., 2008; Bernard et al., 2011). 
Overall, these studies highlight several core findings in this literature. First, competitive 
conditions affect firms’ export opportunities. Thus, industrial sectors with low value-to-weight 
ratios are less suitable for exports being more likely to have a monopolistic structure and anti-
competitive conditions. Second, firm characteristics such as age or size are important for exports. 
Larger firms benefit from economies of scale and scope in terms of production, managerial 
talent, finance and marketing resources, while older firms acquire market knowledge and export 
capabilities to venture abroad (cf. Uppsala model of internationalization). However, the born-
globals literature suggests that age is no longer a necessary precondition for successful overseas 
expansion. Finally, ownership structure is important. Previous studies suggest that foreign-
owned firms are more likely to export than similar domestic firms, presumably because they are 
already linked in to the global networks and possess already of the necessary expertise to 
facilitate successful exports.  
Although most early work on export performance has been confined almost exclusively 
to firms from developed economies (Zou & Stan, 1998; Sousa et al., 2008), there are several 
recent studies that focus explicitly on EEFs (see Table 1). Overall, these studies examine export 
performance via export intensity (i.e., sales from foreign markets as opposed to domestic ones) 
and emphasize the role of microeconomic characteristics, such as product features (Aulakh, 
Kotabe & Teegen, 2000; Filatotchev, Dyomina, Wright & Buck, 2001), financial capabilities 
(Ling-Yee & Ogunmokun, 2001), concentration (Zhao & Zou, 2002), technological capabilities 
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(Wang et al., 2013; He & Wei, 2013), ownership strategies (Yi et al., 2013), and managerial 
characteristics (Agnihotra & Bhattacharya, 2015). In turn, other studies have paid attention to the 
effect of country-level explanations, such as the existence of export promotion programs 
(Alvarez, 2004) or the relative distance of foreign subsidiaries vis-à-vis parent MNEs (Estrin et 
al., 2008; He, Brouthers & Filatotchev , 2013). Together, these studies provide multiple insights 
into what enables and respectively, inhibits, EEF’s export performance.  
However, despite these contributions, this body of work exhibits several important 
limitations. Specifically, many studies examine directly export intensity, without considering 
theoretically (in terms of potentially different explanations) and empirically (in terms of 
correction for self-selection into exporting) the fact that some firms will never export. Moreover, 
while theoretical platforms such as IBV or RBV are generally applicable to all firms’ activities, 
EEs present a particular context in which both institutional features and firm capabilities and 
resources are not the “traditional” ones from a developed country context. To this end, the roles 
of institutional factors such as corruption, political instability or informal competition are yet to 
be examined in the context of exports. Finally most studies in this stream of literature employ a 
single-country context that limits severely the generalization of their findings.  
 
*** Table 1 about here *** 
 
Hypothesis Development 
We theorize the determinants of export performance along the aforementioned two 
dimensions by combining elements from IBV and RBV (see Figure 1). In the first stage of our 
export model we draw upon institutional theory and consider the determinants of export 
propensity. According to IBV, firm behaviour and strategy both at home and abroad is an 
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ultimate result of institutional configurations (Peng et al., 2008). Well-developed institutions 
create a favourable business environment with low transaction costs and high competitive 
pressures which favour efficiency and innovativeness (Hoskisson et al., 2000). In contrast, EEs 
are often plagued by low-quality and unpredictable institutional landscapes that affect differently 
firms and their export strategies (Gao et al., 2010). 
 
***** Figure 1 about here ***** 
 
Pointedly, the institutional environments in EEs typically differ in many ways from those 
in more developed economies including inter alia more unstable political environments, 
pervasive government influence, non-transparent regulatory infrastructures, under-developed 
capital and labour markets, and greater informality (Marquis & Raynard, 2015; Rottig, 2016). 
The combined effects of these institutional deficiencies means that doing business in many 
emerging economies is often beset by opportunistic behaviour, capricious government policies, 
inflated transaction costs, and higher levels of uncertainty (Gao et al., 2010). Under these 
conditions, even efficient and well-run EEFs may find it difficult to expand and/or maximise the 
returns on their resources within the confines of their home economies (Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 
2015; Luiz et al., 2017). Exporting potentially provides an escape route from these constraints, 
and further allows EEFs to capitalise on their factor-cost advantages compared to firms located 
in developed economies. Moreover, exporting allows successful firms not only to access wider 
markets, but also to diversify their revenue streams and reduce unsystematic risk, to benefit from 
experiential learning in overseas markets, and to realise economies of scale and scope (Li, 2007).  
We identify three attributes of the institutional environments within the EEFs home 
countries that merit consideration in relation to EEFs’ export propensity (i.e. the decision to start 
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exporting or not): political instability, competition from the informal sector, and the level of 
corruption. Our focus on these factors is motivated by the broader literature in comparative 
institutional theory that characterizes emerging countries as beset by inefficient regulatory and 
political institutions that fail to ensure market access and provide level playfield (Schneider et 
al., 2010; Shleifer & Vishny, 1993). As we argue below, these specific institutional features of 
EEs are particularly relevant for the exporting decisions of EEFs since they introduce 
uncertainties in their domestic markets, providing a ‘push’ mechanism to seek-out foreign 
markets. 
Political instability has several adverse effects upon business activities in an economy 
(Arráiz et al., 2013). First, political instability creates general uncertainty, and leads to firms 
losing confidence, reducing investment, and retrenching their activities (Alesina & Perotti, 
1996). Suppliers of capital will be less willing to invest or lend to firms, shareholders may 
liquidate their equity holdings, banks may call in loans, and the cost of capital will generally rise 
(Svensson, 1998). Uncertainty will also affect consumers who are likely to lower their 
consumption and hence reduce domestic demand across a range of products (De Boef & 
Kellstedt, 2004). The typical outcome of instability is lower domestic growth (Guillaumont, 
Jeanneney, & Brun, 1999), which in turn means that exporting will become, at the margin, a 
more attractive proposition. In extremis, political instability may give rise to political and/or civil 
violence, which further exacerbates uncertainty and leads to even greater operational difficulties 
(Hiatt & Sine, 2014). Second, business activities in many countries, in advanced economies but a 
fortiori in many emerging economies where political accountability is not strong, are often 
circumscribed by political patronage (Gomez, 2002; Gomez & Jomo, 1999; Wank, 1995). 
Patronage is particularly strong in countries with traditions of strong central governments, and 
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often determines access to finance, operation licenses, raw materials, subsidies, or procurement 
contracts (Kristinsson, 1996). Successful firms adapt to such circumstances in stable political 
environments, and find ways to acquire the necessary patronage to carry out their business 
activities effectively (Fraser, Zhang & Derashid, 2006). But political instability undermines the 
certainties provided by political patronage, and previous helpful links may overnight become 
toxic associations (Alesina & Perotti, 1996). In such circumstances, firms may choose to eschew 
the difficulties and expense of building up new political contacts in favour of venturing into 
more transparent markets overseas. Subsequently, our first hypothesis is: 
H1: There will be a positive relationship between political instability in their home 
countries and the export propensity of EEFs. 
 
Many emerging economies have large informal sectors, broadly defined as economic 
activities that are not recorded in the official GDP statistics (London & Hart, 2004). The size of 
these informal sectors can be significant even in advanced economies, but are typically more 
substantial in emerging and developing economies. For instance, the estimated size of informal 
sectors in Brazil, Russia, India and China is relatively large, at around 39.0%, 43.8%, 22.2% and 
12.7% respectively of GDP during the 2000s (Schneider, Buehn & Montenegro, 2010). While 
the literature points out consistently to the size disparity of the informal sector in emerging 
versus developed economies, little is known about its competitive effects on EEF strategies and 
performance. However, recent findings confirm that informal competition affects important 
aspects of EEF activities, such as new product development, HR development practices or tax 
avoidance strategies (Iriyama, Kishore & Talukdar, 2016; McCann & Bahl, 2016; Gokalp et al., 
2017). Now, notwithstanding the fact that a sizeable informal sector may generate positive 
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benefits for EEs in terms of employment, welfare, and the provision of local services, the 
competitive effect on “formal” (i.e., officially registered) EEFs is likely to be negative and 
considerable (Schneider & Enste, 2000). First, a large informal sector means a smaller number of 
firms on which tax revenues can be levied: this in turn either means reduced spending on 
infrastructure and other public goods to the detriment of all firms and other actors within the 
economy, or to even higher taxes being levied on EEFs in the formal sector (Gerxhani, 2004). 
Second, the existence of a sizeable informal sector makes macroeconomic policy less effective 
(Mara, 2011), restricting the domestic prospects of formal EEFs and impeding economic growth 
in these markets (Gonzalez & Lamanna, 2007). Third, business activities within the informal 
sector are typically conducted outside the official law, with informal social contracts being used 
as binding arrangements (London & Hart, 2004). As such, firms in the formal sector may find it 
difficult to protect their proprietary knowledge and technology though enforceable legal 
mechanisms (McCann & Bahl, 2016). Given these discriminatory conditions, many firms in the 
formal sector will choose to look for more level playing fields in overseas markets in the 
presence of strong informal competition. Thus, our second hypothesis is: 
H2: There will be a positive relationship between the degree of competition from the 
informal sectors in their home countries and the export propensity of EEFs. 
 
Corruption is defined as the abuse of entrusted public power for private gain (Schleifer & 
Vishny, 1993) and involves the payment by firms of bribes and/or other favours to officials in 
order to solicit preferential access to resources, finance, or information (Svensson, 2003). In this 
study we focus on bribery as a form of petty corruption involving usually small payments to low-
ranked governmental officials (Rose-Ackerman, 1999). While the general consensus in the 
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macro-economic literature (“sanding hypothesis”) is that corruption hampers all economic 
activities through increased transaction costs, greater uncertainty, and less transparency in 
markets (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016), other studies (“greasing hypothesis”) suggest that bribery may 
actually improve firms’ competitive position (Martin, Cullen, Johnson & Parboteeah, 2007). For 
instance, in environments plagued by heavy bureaucracy, bribes may eliminate bureaucratic 
bottlenecks, or confer access to public resources that were otherwise confined to those with 
political affiliations, thereby providing unaffiliated firms a faster alternative to achieve their 
goals (Méon & Weill, 2010; Krammer, 2012).  
Given the prevalence and relative institutionalization of corruption in EEs, we argue that 
home-country corruption will positively affect EEFs’ decision to export for a several reasons. 
First, even if corruption would “sand” firm performance at home by eroding its profits and 
resources through bribe demand, the EEF may still use exports strategically to evade, at least 
partially, these additional costs of operating at home (Ang & Cummings, 1997). Most the 
activities associated with domestic sales (e.g., acquisition of land, building permits, product 
regulations, or labour hiring) involve dealing with governmental officials (Djankov, La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2002), which give them numerous opportunities to misuse their 
authority for private gain (Martin et al., 2007). The cost of coping with excessive and arbitrary 
corruption in the home market may encourage EEFs to seek out for other corruption-free markets 
(Lee, Yin, Lee, Weng & Peng, 2015). Consequently, EEFs that are successful in their home 
markets may choose exports as a preferred alternative to doing business at home (Olney, 2016). 
Second, if we adhere to the “efficient grease” perspective, bribes may help EEFs to 
access both domestic resources and foreign markets at a lower cost than the existing institutional 
arrangements. In many EEs, “dual price” practices discriminate between bribing and non-bribing 
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firms (Rose-Ackerman, 1999), and allow the former to achieve significant cost advantages by 
acquiring resources below market prices (Hsieh & Moretti, 2006). To the extent that bribing 
firms use already their resources efficiently, these additional cost savings can be leveraged into 
competitive advantages to compete successfully in international markets (Gao et al., 2010). 
Similarly, accessing foreign markets via exports requires firms to comply with certain regulatory 
provisions regarding transport arrangements, assembling of export documentation, duties 
payment, inspections and clearance (Djankov, Freund, & Pham, 2010). While these regulations 
are quite precise and thus more predictable, bribes often secure a normal or faster than normal 
completion of these operations (Hors, 2001).  Hence, corruption may enable EEFs making these 
payments to potentially secure more advantageous positions as a result of pre-existing 
internationalization and ownership advantages which allows them to compete successfully in 
foreign markets (Lee et al., 2015).  
Finally, the benefits of accessing domestic resources and foreign markets at lower costs 
may be further enhanced due to economies of scale (Fisman & Gatti, 2006). By paying bribes 
repeatedly and forging long-standing relationships with corrupt officials for accessing a wider 
range of resources at a lower cost, EEFs may regard bribes as a fixed cost investment which 
reduces its average cost, as the firm increases sales through exporting to different markets and 
reduces the efficiency of these operations (Lee & Weng, 2003). Conversely, non-bribing EEFs 
looking to export may face more bureaucratic barriers, inability to access certain resources and 
delays in their approvals for export operations (Bertrand, Djankov, Hanna & Mullainathan, 2007; 
Sequeira & Djankov, 2014). These losses in terms of access to resources and loss of time to 
reach foreign markets will put these firms at a competitive disadvantage, thus reducing their 
chances to export in foreign markets (Shleifer & Vishny, 1993). 
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The above discussion suggests that petty corruption will have positive effects on EEFs 
propensity to export, regardless of our view (i.e., greasing or sanding) on corruption. Hence, our 
third hypothesis is: 
H3: There will be a positive relationship between the extent of corruption in their 
home countries and the export propensity of EEFs. 
 
The first three hypotheses have drawn upon IBV arguments to relate different home-
country institutions to the export propensity of EEFs. However, the RBV (Barney, 1991) 
suggests that success in overseas markets (as measured here by export intensity) will crucially 
depend upon how well firms are able to develop distinctive resources and capabilities, and this is 
particularly true for EEFs (Yiu et al., 2007; Gaur et al., 2014). In particular, firm-specific 
capabilities will be required to transform home-country resources (e.g. cheap labor, monopolistic 
advantages) into sustainable and inimitable competitive advantages in overseas markets (Lu, 
Zhou & Li., 2010). Thus, from the RBV perspective, we advance three additional hypotheses 
that relate important firm-specific capabilities to the export intensity of EEFs: the skill level of 
the workforce, access to external technologies, and the experience of top management. 
There are several mechanisms through which the skill level of the workforce will impact 
the success (i.e., intensity) of EEF exports. First, educational attainment (i.e., general, business, 
or technical) provides EEF employees with valuable skills, which are particularly useful for the 
intensity of export activities (Ganotakis & Love, 2012). Problem-solving and cognitive skills 
from high levels of general education for employees can help EEFs in better exploiting the new 
opportunities arising in foreign markets (Cooper, Gimeno-Gascon & Woo, 1994). Furthermore, 
business education of employees will result into tailored management, operational and marketing 
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strategies which account for idiosyncrasies of foreign markets (Samiee & Walters, 2000) and 
increase the effectiveness of export operations (Knight & Cavusgil, 2004). Finally, any skills 
from technological education will spur more innovation and new products (Gourlay, Seaton, & 
Suppakitjarak, 2005; Krammer, 2016), which will result in higher exports (Kundu & Katz, 
2003). 
In addition, skilled employees are more likely to increase the quality and diversity of 
existing products, thus affecting positively EEF’s export intensity (Morgan, Kaleka & Katsikeas, 
2004; Lages, Silva, & Styles, 2009). Quality is equated to meeting specifications and “doing it 
right the first time”, resulting in fewer defects and more efficient processes. Key to the 
generation of product quality are the skills of the workforce and whether or not these skills fit the 
purpose (Hummels, Munch, Skipper & Xiang, 2012). Better product quality in turn leads, on the 
one hand, to lower manufacturing and service costs and, on the other hand, to a better reputation 
and increased sales particularly in overseas markets (Gervais, 2015). Both these factors will 
confer EEFs with comparative advantage for exports. Likewise, adoption of a differentiation 
market-based strategy for exports by offering tailored products to foreign markets will increase 
EEF’s success abroad (Knight & Cavusgil, 2004). A skilled workforce allows EEFs to take 
advantage of economies of scope by redirecting excess resources (e.g., know-how, production) 
towards expanding sales abroad (Montgomery, 1994). Subsequently, such international 
diversification will reduce significantly EEF’s vulnerability in the face of adverse shocks that 
commonly affect emerging markets (Witt & Lewin, 2007). In sum, the skill level of EEF’s 
employees will facilitate the development of suitable operational, managerial and product 
strategies, effectively increasing the intensity of its exports. Thus, our fourth hypothesis is: 
H4: There will be a positive relationship between the skill level of the workforce and 
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the export intensity of EEFs. 
 
The RBV emphasises that the development and exploitation of valuable firm-specific 
technological capabilities is vital for firms wishing to generate sustainable competitive 
advantages (Grant, 1991). One option is for EEFs to develop such capabilities internally through 
their own R&D efforts, but such efforts typically require not only an initial base of significant 
and appropriate technological capabilities but also considerable investments of both finance and 
human capital (Yassar & Paul, 2007; Krammer, 2009). Furthermore, such internal efforts are 
often fraught with uncertainty, and may take years to come to fruition (Teece, 1986). Many firms 
thus turn to external sources to complement and enhance their internal technological capabilities, 
and thus facilitate the development of more advanced products and processes (Krammer, 2016). 
External knowledge sourcing may be effected through various channels (Chung & Yeaple, 
2008), and this enables firms to access state-of-the-art technology more quickly and with greater 
assurance (Chatterji & Manuel, 1993). In turn, accessing external technology has positive 
impacts on multiple dimensions of firm performance, including innovation, growth, and financial 
success (Denicolai, Zucchella & Strange, 2014; Krammer, 2014; Tsai & Wang, 2008). 
These considerations are all the more important for EEFs, whose competitive advantages 
in global markets have historically been due more to home country factor-cost advantages than to 
their firm-specific technological prowess. This has been particularly true for EEFs that are 
exporting to advanced economy markets, as their products are often viewed as lacking in 
sophistication (Wright et al., 2005). In this way, access to new technologies yields immediate 
and tangible benefits for EEFs in terms of development of new products geared for export 
markets (Wang et al., 2013; Wang & Li-Ying, 2014; Athreye & Kapur, 2015). The advantages of 
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externally accessing and harnessing sophisticated capabilities resides in the wider range of 
production capabilities available, and the higher quality of these products, all of which will allow 
EEFs to reach advanced export markets and more sophisticated clients in export markets 
(Bhaduri & Ray, 2004; Rodriguez & Rodriguez, 2005). Consequently, our fifth hypothesis is: 
H5: There will be a positive relationship between the access to external technologies 
and the export intensity of EEFs. 
 
The lack of knowledge about global markets is often cited as one of the main barriers to 
successful exporting. In addition to having a good quality product, export success requires 
managers to poses also specific knowledge and experience regarding entering, operating, and 
adapting to the particularities of overseas markets, from production processes to relationships 
with suppliers and targeting of consumers (Koh, 1991; Das, 1994; Lages & Montgomery, 2005). 
Much of this knowledge is industry-specific, involving transposition and adaptation of existing 
(domestic) capabilities and resources to the characteristics and needs of foreign markets 
(Sapienza et al., 2006; Lengler, Sousa & Marques, 2013).  
Now much of the requisite knowledge will reside with the top management team, and 
will have been accrued through own experiences of foreign markets (Sousa et al., 2008). These 
experiences enhance their abilities to perceive opportunities, threats and risks in foreign markets, 
and to devise effective solutions and strategies (Lages & Montgomery, 2005). We would thus 
expect managers with more years of industry experience to be more perceptive in selecting 
suitable export markets, more adept at formulating an appropriate marketing mix for each 
market, and more skilled at managing the firm personnel effectively to create and sustain 
competitive advantage (Yiu et al., 2007). Such experienced managers would be valuable in any 
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firm, but their scarcity in many emerging economies will make them especially valuable for 
EEFs seeking to establish themselves in overseas markets (Bloom, Genakos, Sadun & Van 
Reenen, 2012). Hence, we propose that: 
H6: There will be a positive relationship between the experience of top management and 
the export intensity of EEFs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
METHOD 
Data Source and Sample 
For our analysis, we use firm-level data for Brazil, Russia, India and China from the World 
Bank’s Enterprise Surveys (WBES) database. The WBES collects firm-level data worldwide that 
covers information about the countries’ business environments, firm performance and growth.  
The major advantage of WBES is that the data are collected systematically using standardized 
surveys and stratified sampling techniques to ensure representative coverage for a given country. 
Our analysis is based on the harmonized 2015 release of WBES, which includes surveys 
undertaken within a few years of difference, the earliest being in Brazil (2009), followed by 
Russia and China (2012), and India (2014). After cleaning the dataset by removing firms with 
missing data, we are left with a total sample of 16,748 firms: 1,183 of these firms were from 
Brazil; 2,496 from Russia; 9,160 from India and 3,943 from China.  
 
Dependent Variables  
Table 2 summarizes the operationalization of the variables in our analysis. We have two 
dependent variables corresponding to the two stages of our theoretical model. Following our 
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theoretical bearings we make a distinction between two important outcomes: whether or not the 
firm exports (EXPRO- Export propensity), and how much it exports (EXINT- Export intensity), 
given that the underlying factors driving these two outcomes are not necessarily the same (Estrin 
et al., 2008).  
 
*** Table 2 about here *** 
Independent Variables  
There are three variables related to the institutional environments in the home countries of the 
EEFs. The first institutional variable (POL) measures political instability based on managers’ 
responses to the question: “To what extent is political instability an obstacle to the current 
operations of this establishment?” The second institutional variable (INF) captures the extent to 
which competition from the informal sector affects business operations (“To what extent are the 
practices of competitors in the informal sector an obstacle to the current operations of this 
establishment?”). For both INF and POL The responses have five possible values ranging from 
no obstacle (0), to minor, to moderate, to major, and to very severe obstacle (4). Our third 
institutional variable (CORR) captures the extent of corruption based on the value of bribes paid 
by the firm (“On average, what percentage of total annual sales, or estimated total annual value, 
do establishments like this pay in informal payments or gifts to public officials to get things 
done?”). 
The effects of institutions are likely to vary within countries, industries and regions 
within which the EEFs operate. To address this, we convert our firm-specific responses for 
political instability, informal sector competition, and corruption into region-industry averages for 
these 100 regions using 2-digit ISIC codes. The WBES identifies 100 administrative regions 
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within the BRIC economies: 25 in China; 15 in Brazil; 23 in India; and 37 in Russia. This 
conversion has two important advantages: it addressed explicitly the large administrative 
heterogeneity within these countries (Xu & Shenkar, 2002; Busenitz, Gomez & Spencer, 2000; 
Yi et al., 2013) and reduces the problems of reverse causation and measurement error (Fisman & 
Svensson, 2007) – see below the subsection on common method variance for further discussion. 
Our second set of independent variables includes three firm-specific capabilities of the 
EEFs. For the skill level of the workforce (SKILL) we use the percentage of skilled workers in 
total production (i.e. non-managerial) worker force. Skilled workers are defined as those with 
specialized technical knowledge, whether it is acquired at work through apprenticeship and on-
the-job training, or by obtaining a college, university or technical diploma. The second variable 
(MAN) captures managerial capabilities using the experience of the top manager based on the 
question: “How many years of experience does the top manager have working in this industry?” 
Finally, we measure external technological capabilities (TECH) using a dummy variable that 
indicates if the establishment at present uses technology licensed from a foreign-owned 
company.  
 
Control Variables 
To account for firm heterogeneity, we control for a number of variables that were deemed as 
important by the export literature. Specifically, we include firm size (SIZE), as the number of 
permanent employees, given that larger firms tend to internationalize faster and to a greater 
degree than smaller firms (Bernard et al., 2007). We also include firm age, computed as the 
logarithm of the number of years since the EEF was established (AGE). While the effect of age 
is still debated, most studies in this area recommend it as a good predictor for exports (Yiu et al., 
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2007; Bigsten & Gebreeyesus, 2009). The third control (FOREIGN) measures foreign ownership 
(i.e., the percentage of firm owned by private foreign individuals, companies or organizations), 
as foreign-own companies are known to have better technologies and market linkages which can 
improve export performance (Singh, 2009). Similarly, we control for public ownership 
(PUBLIC), i.e., percentage of ownership by the government/state, given the importance of state-
own firms in emerging economies (Bai & Wang, 1998). Finally, we control for the quality of 
workforce (WORK), measured using EEF managers’ subjective ratings (in a scale of 0 to 4) on 
the extent to which lack of educated workforce posed an obstacle to establishment operations. 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics  
Table 3 presents descriptive results for the variables described above, for the whole sample and 
for sub-samples from each of the four countries. The average value of EXPRO indicates that 
16% the firms in our dataset are exporters. The proportion of exporters ranges from 9% in Russia 
to 24% in China. We also conduct group mean comparisons using one-way analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) to test if the average values of EXPRO differ significantly across countries. The result 
of this test reveals that EXPRO differs significantly across firms in BRIC countries. The average 
export intensity (EXINT) is 6.4%; with firms from Russia (2.5%) and China (10.4%) 
respectively register the lowest and highest levels of export sales. These results are in line with 
the previous literature (e.g. Singh, 2009; Bernard et al., 2011). However, if we exclude non-
exporting firms and focus on the truncated sample, the average export intensity is much higher at 
39%. India and China have the highest ratios (46% and 44% respectively), followed by Russia 
(26%) and Brazil (19%).  Again, group mean comparisons using one-way ANOVA indicates 
significant differences of EXINT (and all independent variables) across the BRIC countries (see 
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footnote 3 of Table 3).  
 
*** Table 3 about here *** 
 
Table 3 suggests that competition from the informal sector (INF) and political instability 
(POL) are considered relatively less important in China than in the other BRIC countries. 
Moreover, corruption (CORR) is considered less of a problem in China than in the other BRIC 
countries, with payments for informal gifts constituting only 0.22% of total sales revenue on 
average, compared to 1% of sales in Brazil and Russia. This is not unique to our data, since 
China also fares relatively better among the BRIC countries in institutional rankings by other 
indicators. According to the World Bank’s Governance Indicators, China is the best ranked in 
terms of corruption control among the BRIC (being at the 47th percentile of the sample in 2014), 
and second best in political stability following Brazil.  
Turning to the control variables, the average firm age is 19 years old, and this ranges 
from young Russian and Chinese firms (with average ages of 14 and 16 years, respectively), to 
the relatively older Brazilian firms (28 years of age on average). The highest level of foreign 
ownership (FOREIGN) is observed in Brazil (4.7%), whereas those from India have the lowest 
level (0.5%). Public ownership (PUBLIC) is the highest in China (3%) and the lowest in Brazil 
(0.04%). The low level of public ownership, especially in China, is the result of the sampling 
design of the WBES dataset, which excludes wholly state-owned enterprises. In terms of firm 
size (SIZE), the average firm has 124 permanent workers, Chinese firms being the largest ones 
(233 workers) whereas Russian firms are the smallest (66 workers).  Table 4 presents the 
pairwise correlation coefficients among these variables, which follow pretty much our 
expectations.  
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*** Table 4 about here *** 
 
Empirical Strategy 
We use a Heckman two-stage estimation procedure to deal with potential sample selection bias 
(Hult et al., 2008). The first stage involves probit estimation to model export propensity (where 
the dependent variable is EXPRO, equalling 1 if a firm is an exporter, and 0 otherwise). The 
probit estimation incorporates the three institutional variables (POL, INF, CORR), the control 
variables, and the country and industry dummies. The model is estimated using the full sample of 
17,201 observations. The second stage uses linear regression to model export intensity only 
among the exporting firms (where the dependent variable is EXINT, namely what percentage of 
firm’s sale come from exports). This estimation incorporates the three firm-specific resource 
variables (SKILL, MAN, and TECH), the control variables, the country and industry dummies, 
and the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) which is obtained from the first-stage regression. The IMR is 
calculated from the truncated mean of the first-stage probit estimation, which in turn is obtained 
from the generalized residuals for the EEFs reporting non-zero exports. It corrects for the fact 
that the sample of exporting EEFs is not random (Bernard et al., 2007), as the linear estimation 
for EXINT only includes the truncated sample of exporting firms. The estimated coefficient of 
the IMR is a function of the correlation between the error terms of the two models. Hence, if 
significant, it indicates the existence of a sample selection bias and the direction of this 
correlation. Thus, the regression models to be estimated are: !"#$%!"# = !! + !! !"#!"# + !! !"#!"# + !! !"##!"# + !! !!"# + !! !! + !! !! + !!"#! !!!(1)      !"#$%!"# = !! + !! !"#$$!"# + !! !"!"!"# + !! !"#!"# + !!! !"#! + !!! !!"# + !! !! +!! !! + !!"#! !!(2)  
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In these equations i refers to the firm, j the industry it operates in and the c denotes one of 
the four BRIC countries. X is the vector of control variables (SIZE, AGE, FOREIGN, PUBLIC, 
WORK) and !! and !! are the corresponding vectors of coefficients of the control variables in 
each regression. Dj and Dc are vectors of industry and country dummies that capture 
heterogeneities across countries and industries (Riedl, 2010). Controlling for country effects is 
important since, as indicated earlier, group mean comparisons reveal significant differences of all 
variables across the BRIC countries. Finally, !! and !!!denote the error terms in each regression, 
which are uncorrelated once the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) is introduced in the second 
regression. The estimations were conducted jointly using the heckman routine in Stata 14. 
 
 
Common Method Variance  
One of the main issues when using survey data for statistical analysis is common method 
variance (CMV). This holds especially true when the independent and dependent variables are 
drawn from the same source, potentially leading to spurious correlations that arise from the way 
the data constructs are measured. We believe that CMV is not a serious issue in our analysis for 
several reasons. First, CMV may be mitigated at the survey design stage by appropriate s 
ordering of the questions and by guaranteeing respondents’ anonymity at the reporting stage 
(Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee & Podsakoff, 2003). The World Bank Enterprise Surveys do not 
include any personal information that could identify the respondents, and this strongly reduces 
the likelihood that managers presented socially desirable answers. Second, both our dependent 
variables (EXPRO and EXINT) are not perceptual measures, but are based on accounting data, 
which are checked for consistency by the interviewers themselves. CMV is less likely to appear 
when objective rather than perceptual data are used. Third, we have constructed region-industry 
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averages for our three institutional variables, rather than relying on individual firm-specific 
responses from surveys, which may suffer from measurement errors, particularly in the case of 
sensitive questions like corruption (Fisman & Svensson, 2007). Thus, averaging over large 
numbers of firms will significantly reduce any potential bias from using firm responses 
(Podsakoff et al., 2003).  
 
RESULTS 
Baseline Results  
We begin by presenting the results from the probit estimation of the first stage of our model of 
export performance. The dependent variable is export propensity (EXPRO), and the independent 
variables include the three hypothesised variables related to the institutional environments in the 
EEFs’ home countries. The results are reported in Table 5 (Models 1-5).  
 
*** Table 5 about here *** 
 
Model 1 includes only the control variables. The three institutional variables are included 
separately in models 2-4, and then all three are included in model 5. SIZE and AGE have 
statistically significant impacts on export probability, indicating that larger and older EEFs are 
more likely to engage in exporting. Foreign-owned EEFs are also more likely to engage in 
exporting, which is in line with the literature (Bernard et al., 2007), while partial public 
ownership (PUBLIC) has a significant negative effect, potentially because it introduces soft-
budget constraints that reduce the incentive to engage in exporting (Bai & Wang, 1998).  Our 
measure of the quality of the workforce (WORK) is insignificant. 
Political instability (POL) appears with positive and significant coefficients both when it 
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is included separately (model 2) and with all other institutional variables (model 5). This shows 
that a higher degree of political instability in the home market of EEFs is associated with higher 
export propensity, confirming our first hypothesis. Political instability is often more intense in 
emerging economies than in developed countries and this poses a constraint to competitive EEFs. 
This in turn drives firms to seek out for alternative markets through which they can expand and 
diversify their market reach (Guillaumont et al., 1999). Similarly, the variable capturing the 
extent of competition from the informal sector (INF) has positive and significant coefficients in 
models 3 and 5. This lends support for our second hypothesis, suggesting that EEFs that face 
pressure from informal competitors are more likely to turn to overseas markets. Finally, the level 
of corruption in the domestic institutional environment (CORR) appears insignificant in models 
4 and 5, suggesting that corruption is not a significant determinant of the export decisions of 
EEFs. Thus we find strong support for hypotheses H1 and H2, but not for H3. 
We next consider the results from the linear regression estimation of the second stage of 
our model of export performance (Models 6-10). The dependent variable is export intensity 
(EXINT), and the independent variables include the three hypothesised variables related to the 
firm-specific capabilities and the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) imputed from the export propensity 
model. The results are reported in Table 6. The Wald tests at the bottom of the Table strongly 
reject the null hypothesis that all coefficients in the regression models are zero, thereby 
confirming the goodness of fit of the models. The coefficients of the IMR variable are highly 
statistically significant (p < 0.01) in all models, confirming that the error terms of the first and 
second stage regressions are correlated with each other supporting our choice of the Heckman 
procedure. The appropriateness of our proposed two-stage model of export performance can 
further be assessed by comparing the coefficients of the control variables on export propensity 
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and export intensity. Firm size (SIZE), firm age (AGE), and foreign ownership (FOREIGN) all 
had positive and very significant effects on export propensity, whilst public ownership 
(PUBLIC) had a very significant negative effect. These results suggest that larger, older, private, 
and foreign-owned firms are more likely to be exporters than smaller, younger, publicly-owned 
and domestic firms. However, neither foreign ownership nor public ownership has significant 
effects upon export intensity, whilst both firm size and firm age have very significant negative 
effects. These results suggest that the most successful EEFs in export markets are smaller and 
younger firms, presumably because they are more entrepreneurial and less encumbered by past 
experiences operating in command economies. These results also highlight the usefulness of 
estimating separate models for explaining the two measures of export performance (EXPRO & 
EXPINT) since they may not be necessarily affected by the same factors or in the same way. 
*** Table 6 about here *** 
We now consider the effects of our hypothesized firm capabilities. The significant 
coefficient for SKILL shows that EEFs with skilled workforces are able to export a higher share 
of their total sales. This confirms the value of a qualified and well-skilled workforce as a 
strategic resource that can advance firm competitiveness (Wagner, 2007). Moreover, the positive 
and significant effect TECH on export intensity confirms the value of external technological 
capabilities to produce goods of sufficient quality to compete in international markets (Bhaduri 
& Ray, 2004). However, the insignificant coefficient for MAN fails to give support to the 
importance of managerial experience for export performance. This may be because the export 
intensity of many EEFs still depends upon home country factor cost advantages, hence 
substantial managerial experience is not a particularly important capability. Alternatively, it may 
be because more experienced managers are likely to be employed in older firms (the correlation 
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between MAN and AGE is a significant 0.39, Table 4), hence the hypothesized beneficial effects 
of top management experience may be offset by the negative effects of firm age as noted above. 
Thus we find strong support for hypotheses H4 and H5, but not for H6. 
 
Robustness Tests  
We also conduct additional tests using alternative measures of POL, INF and CORR to ascertain 
the robustness of the first stage results. We were able to construct alternative measures using a 
question in the WBES dataset about the features of the business environment that could 
adversely affect performance. Fifteen specific factors had been identified from previous surveys 
that explored important constraints for business performance, including political instability, 
competition from informal firms, and corruption but also a range of other factors including 
financial access, electricity, access to land, transportation, taxation, customs etc. Managers were 
asked to select “the biggest problem” their firms were facing among the presented 15 constraints.  
The data shows that corruption was selected as the “biggest problem” by 13% of the 
firms, whilst 10% of the firms cited competition from informal firms, and 3% cited political 
instability. For our robustness analysis, we construct three alternative measures (POL_Alt, 
INF_Alt and CORR_Alt) by calculating the percentages of firms in each industry-region that 
indicated, respectively, political instability, informal competition and corruption as their most 
important constraints. Each of these alternative constructs was significantly correlated (p<0.01) 
with their baseline counterparts, suggesting internal consistency among our constructs although 
they were measured in a very different way. The results of this analysis (Table 7) confirm our 
baseline results that political instability (Model 11 and 14) and informal competition (Model 12) 
have significant positive effect on export propensity. Interestingly the alternative measure of 
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corruption (CORR_Alt) is positive and significant in Models 13 and 14, providing partial 
evidence for our third hypothesis, which predicts a positive effect of corruption on export 
propensity.  
 
*** Table 7 about here *** 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
We have examined the export performance of EEFs by focusing on the combined effects 
of institutional elements and firm-specific capabilities to explain the two key dimensions of 
export performance (i.e., propensity and intensity). Our hypotheses have been underpinned by 
arguments drawn from institutional theory and from the resource-based view of the firm, and we 
have found strong empirical support for four of our six hypotheses (and weaker support for a 
fifth).  We find that EEFs are more likely to become exporters if they perceive more political 
instability and greater informal competition in their home regions, while the intensity of their 
exporting activities are significantly related to internal capabilities such as the skill level of their 
workforce and access to external technologies. These findings resonate with calls in the literature 
(e.g. Hoskisson et al., 2000) to focus on the relationship between firms’ assets and the changing 
nature of their home countries’ institutional infrastructures.  
Our study advances both theoretically and empirically the existing literature on EEF 
exports. In terms of theory, we examine the effects of both institutional factors and firm 
capabilities in determining two distinct, yet intertwined, dimensions of exports (i.e., propensity 
and intensity). Subsequently, we develop formal explanations for these dimensions of exports by 
combining IBV and RBV explanations that cater to the particularities of EEF capabilities and 
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their institutional contexts. Given the inherent link between these dimensions, we are able to 
better explain how and why certain EEFs are more successful in terms of exports than other. 
Furthermore, in terms of empirics, we match our theoretical conjectures with the appropriate 
empirical tools and measures (i.e., Heckman selection model, sub-national measures of 
institutions) and we employ a unique comparative context (more than 16,000 firms from the four 
biggest emerging economies, i.e., Brazil, Russia, India and China) to test our theoretical 
conjectures. In this way we provide a more comprehensive analysis of EEF export performance 
and distinguish from the bulk of prior studies that have commonly focused on one or a couple of 
countries as a testing ground for theory. This allows us to go beyond country and industry 
contingencies and examine more generally EEF behaviour across several heterogeneous EE 
environments (Estrin et al., 2008). 
 
Implications for Theory 
 Our study bears two important theoretical implications. First, the decision to export and 
the actual export performance of firms are deeply intertwined and this relationship should be 
reflected in our conceptualization of these activities. In response, we advance a two-stage 
theoretical model for the export performance of EEFs by hypothesizing different determinants of 
export propensity and of export intensity. While most studies focus solely on one of these 
aspects, we argue that it is important to understand the interplay between these export 
dimensions (Gao et al., 2010). As such, we posit that while export intensity is contingent on 
firm-specific capabilities, home-country institutions will exert an indirect influence by affecting 
firm probability to enter exporting in the first place (Figure 1). In doing so we uphold the joint 
importance of RBV and IBV and support previous calls in the literature to employ and combine 
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theoretical elements for a better understanding of EEFs’ strategies (Filatotchev et al., 2001; Gaur 
et al., 2014). 
 Second, we offer several novel IBV and RBV explanations for EEF exports. We contend 
that institutional features in home countries (i.e., informal competition, the extent of corruption, 
and the degree of political instability) produce an “institutional misalignment” between the 
firms’ needs and their institutional settings (Witt & Lewin, 2007). This misalignment provides 
EEFs with a motivation to seek out exporting opportunities, and to switch their focus from 
domestic to foreign operations (Gonzalez & Lamanna, 2007; Lee & Weng, 2013; Hiatt & Sine, 
2014). These institutional arguments explain why EEFs may opt for internationalization via 
exports, and augment prior insights on how firms escape from institutional pressures in their 
home markets (Witt & Lewin, 2007; Boisot & Mayer, 2008). Complementary to this, we argue 
that EEFs are confronted with different challenges in terms of export capabilities than the 
traditional ones that apply to firms from developed countries (Gaur et al., 2014). Therefore, we 
develop theoretical arguments for the role of several firm capabilities (i.e., level of skills by 
workers, acquisition of external technologies, and the experience of top-management) that are 
particularly salient for EEFs in terms of achieving greater exporting success. In this way we 
contribute to the resource-based explanations of exports by reinforcing the relevance of EEF-
specific capabilities for their success abroad (Yi et al., 2013). 
 
Implications for Practice 
The implications for firms’ managers are relatively straightforward. Successful export 
performance depends upon having a skilled workforce and externally sourced technological 
capabilities though, apparently, managerial capabilities are not that important in the context of 
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EEs. As noted above, this may reflect the empirical reality that more experienced managers tend 
to be employed by older firms, and older firms tend to have lower export intensities. Or it may be 
because many EEFs export labour-intensive products through intermediaries and so the 
managerial skills required are neither sophisticated nor needing to be internalised within the 
exporting firms. As more EEFs produce increasingly more sophisticated goods for export in the 
future, then it is likely that they will need to concomitantly develop the requisite managerial 
skills.  
The implications for policy-makers are less obvious. Export propensity is positively 
related to political instability, the informal sector competition and (to a lesser extent) the 
existence of a corrupt home-country environment. While these contingencies may encourage 
EEFs to seek out alternative markets overseas, it may have devastating effects on the 
performance of domestic firms, thereby resulting in overall negative effects on these economies 
as a whole. The policy recommendations must surely be for governments to seek to improve the 
institutional environments at home so that the best firms are able to prosper both at home and 
overseas. 
 
 
Limitations and Future Research 
While providing some original insights into the drivers of EEF export performance, this 
study also has several limitations, which provide interesting avenues for future research. First, 
the sample of EEFs is drawn from the four large BRIC economies. Certainly all four BRIC 
economies are emerging economies, but are they typical of all EEs? Or does their size (and other 
key features such as their political systems) mean that they are atypical cases? We would thus 
suggest that our analysis be replicated using a sample of firms from both small and large EEs. 
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Second, we have focused on three institutional features (corruption, political instability and 
informal competition), which are both salient and relatively unexplored in prior EEF literature. 
While our theoretical arguments and our subsequent empirical findings justify this choice, there 
are other institutional features (e.g., political networks, financial development, bureaucratic 
reforms, etc.) that future studies may consider as base for theoretical development and empirical 
advancement of the EEF export literature. Third, the cross-sectional nature of our dataset 
prevents us from controlling for other time-variant variables that may affect firms’ export 
behaviour but are not captured in these surveys. As more rounds of Enterprise Surveys are 
developed, future studies may want to employ panel techniques to control for this unobserved 
heterogeneity. Finally, a more comprehensive assessment of the causal links between export 
performance, firm capabilities and home country institutional environments would also require 
the analysis of longitudinal (i.e., panel) data to capture any dynamic effects of this relationship. 
Such analysis would hopefully throw more light upon how, and in which ways, institutional 
features either facilitate or hamper firm performance, and thus clarify the policy conundrum 
identified in the practical implications. 
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Table 1: Previous Studies of the Export Performance of Emerging Economy Firms (EEFs) 
 
Study Dataset Dependent Variable Significant Determinants 
Aulakh et al. 
(2000) 
Firms from Brazil, Chile & 
Mexico 
Subjective measure of 
export performance   
Cost leadership 
Product differentiation  
Marketing standardization 
Filatotchev 
et al. (2001) 
152 firms from Russia, 
Ukraine & Belarus 
Export intensity Product development 
Foreign partners 
Unrelated acquisitions  
Ling-yee & 
Ogunmokun 
(2001) 
111 Chinese firms Subjective export 
performance 
Marketing planning capability 
Export financing capability 
Relationship cooperation  
Changes in relational intensity 
Zhao & Zou 
(2002) 
1049 Chinese firms  Export propensity and 
export intensity 
Industry concentration  
Geographic location  
Alvarez 
(2004) 
295 Chilean SMEs Export intensity Efforts in international business (through export 
committees) 
Process innovation 
Utilization of 
export promotion programs   
Estrin et al. 
(2008) 
494 MNE subsidiaries from 
Egypt, South Africa, India, 
Vietnam, Poland & Hungary 
Export propensity and 
export intensity  
Distance from parent MNE 
Size of parent MNEs 
Acquisition of subsidiaries 
Host country institutions  
Filatotchev, 
Stephan & 
Jindra(2008) 
434 FIEs from Poland, 
Hungary, Slovenia, Slovakia 
& Estonia 
Export intensity Majority foreign ownership 
Foreign control over marketing  
Foreign control over strategic management  
Singh (2009) 3542 Indian manufacturing 
firms, 1990-2005 
Export intensity Firm size, R&D intensity, Advertising intensity, 
Business group affiliation, Industry effects 
Gao et al. 
(2010) 
18644 Chinese firms, 2001-
2005 
Export propensity and 
export intensity 
Cost leadership, 
Differentiation, free market institutions, 
intermediary institutions, and industry export 
orientation  
He et al. 
(2013) 
285 Chinese manufacturing 
firms, 2008 
Export channel choice 
(Subjective indicator) 
Market orientation capabilities 
institutional distance between home and target 
country 
He & Wei 
(2013) 
196 Chinese manufacturing 
firms 
 A subjective 
composite indicator of 
export performance  
External networks; Propensity of exporting to 
distant markets; Absorptive capacity (moderator)  
Lengler et 
al. (2013) 
197 Brazilian firms Export sales and  
export profit 
Customer orientation 
Competitor orientation 
Wang et al. 
(2013) 
141 Chinese manufacturing 
firms, 2000-2003 
Export intensity and 
export volume   
External technology acquisition  
 
Yi et al. 
(2013) 
359,874 Chinese 
manufacturing firms, 2005-
2007 
Export intensity Foreign ownership, business group affiliation, 
and the degree of marketization as moderators of 
the link between innovation and exporting 
Agnihotra & 
Bhattacharya 
(2015) 
450 Indian manufacturing 
firms, 2002-2012 
Export intensity Top management team characteristics 
including—educational level, functional 
heterogeneity, international exposure, age, and 
length of tenure with their current firm. 
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Table 2: Description of the Variables and their Expected Impact on Export Performance  
 
Variable Description  Expected 
impact on 
export 
performance 
EXPRO Dummy variable, whose value = 1 if the EEF reports a positive amount of exports, and = 0 otherwise  NA* 
EXINT Continuous variable ranging between 0 and 100, measuring exports as a percentage of total sales NA* 
POL Industry-region level measure of political instability, based on averages of subjective assessments by the EEF managers, on a five point scale (ranging from 0 to 4) + 
INF 
Industry-region level measure of competition from the informal sector, based on 
averages of subjective assessments by the EEF managers, on a five point scale (ranging 
from 0 to 4) 
+ 
CORR The extent of corruption, measured by the amount of informal payments as a percentage of total annual sales paid by firms “to get things done” +/- 
SKILL 
The percentage of skilled workers in total production (i.e. non-managerial) work force. 
Skilled workers are those who have “special knowledge”, either acquired at work, or 
obtained through attendance of a college, university or technical school. 
+ 
MAN The years of industry experience of the top manager working in the EEF (expressed in logs). + 
TECH Dummy variable, whose value = 1 if the establishment uses technology licensed from a foreign-owned company, and = 0 otherwise + 
SIZE The size of the firm, measured by the number of permanent employees (expressed in logs) + 
AGE The number of years since the firm was established (expressed in logs) +/- 
FOREIGN  The percentage share of equity ownership by “private foreign individuals, companies or organizations” + 
PUBLIC  The percentage share of ownership by the state or government.   +/- 
WORK  Subjective assessments by the EEF managers of the obstacles posed by inadequately-educated workforces, on a five point scale (ranging from 0 to 4) - 
Note:  *- not applicable (these are dependent variables in our selection model) 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics  
 
Variable 
All BRICs Brazil Russia India China 
Mean St. Dev. Mean Mean Mean Mean 
EXPRO 0.16 0.36 0.20 0.09 0.16 0.24 
EXINT 6.35 20.03 3.66 2.48 7.26 10.42 
POL 1.13 0.77 2.38 1.30 1.13 0.27 
INF 1.08 0.69 2.22 0.92 1.07 0.87 
CORR 0.50 1.51 1.03 0.98 0.30 0.22 
SKILL 51.01 23.53 52.55 57.21 53.33 35.26 
TECH 0.11 0.32 0.15 0.08 0.10 0.24 
MAN 14.68 9.46 22.43 14.28 13.40 16.40 
SIZE 124.02 551.94 181.06 65.71 112.52 232.77 
AGE 18.95 13.29 27.79 14.45 20.61 15.73 
FOREIGN 1.62 11.44 4.82 1.94 0.50 3.71 
PUBLIC 0.65 6.92 0.04 0.46 0.13 3.16 
WORK 1.18 1.23 2.95 1.32 1.00 0.76 
       
No. of observations 16,748  1,183 2,496 9,160 3,943 
 
Notes: (1) See Table 2 for detailed definitions of the variables. 
(2) The figures presented in this Table for SIZE and AGE are in the original units (numbers of 
employees, and years respectively), whilst the logs of these figures are used in the regression 
analyses. 
(3) We test the equality of means of all reported variables across countries. Group mean 
comparisons using one-way ANOVA indicate that the means of all reported variables differ 
significantly across countries (p < 0.01). Since the test results are homogenous, they are not 
reported to conserve space.  
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Table 4: The Correlation Matrix  
 
 EXPRO EXINT POL INF CORR SKILL TECH MAN SIZE AGE FOREIGN PUBLIC WORK 
EXPRO 1.00             
EXINT 0.73 
(0.00) 
1.00            
POL 0.05 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.06) 
1.00           
INF 0.03 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.13) 
0.45 
(0.00) 
1.00          
CORR -0.02 
(0.00) 
-0.04 
(0.00) 
0.13 
(0.00) 
0.11 
(0.00) 
1.00         
SKILL -0.02 
(0.08) 
0.01 
(0.24) 
0.27 
(0.00) 
0.10 
(0.00) 
0.05 
(0.00) 
1.00        
TECH 0.14 
(0.00) 
0.12 
(0.00) 
-0.05 
(0.00) 
-0.04 
(0.00) 
-0.02 
(0.01) 
-0.05 
(0.00) 
1.00       
MAN 0.13 
(0.00) 
0.05 
(0.00) 
0.14 
(0.00) 
0.12 
(0.00) 
0.03 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.31) 
0.01 
(0.19) 
1.00      
SIZE 0.14 
(0.00) 
0.10 
(0.00) 
-0.04 
(0.00) 
-0.02 
(0.00) 
-0.02 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.46) 
0.11 
(0.00) 
0.07 
(0.00) 
1.00     
AGE 0.14 
(0.00) 
0.05 
(0.00) 
0.15 
(0.00) 
0.14 
(0.00) 
-0.02 
(0.00) 
0.06 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.44) 
0.39 
(0.00) 
0.13 
(0.00) 
1.00    
FOREIGN 0.14 
(0.00) 
0.10 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.56) 
0.00 
(0.95) 
-0.01 
(0.32) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
0.16 
(0.00) 
0.03 
(0.00) 
0.06 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.48) 
1.00   
PUBLIC -0.01 
(0.07) 
-0.01 
(0.15) 
-0.07 
(0.00) 
-0.06 
(0.00) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.04) 
-0.01 
(0.20) 
0.01 
(0.12) 
0.09 
(0.00) 
0.03 
(0.00) 
-0.01 
(0.32) 
1.00  
WORK 0.03 
(0.00) 
-0.02 
(0.01) 
0.42 
(0.00) 
0.34 
(0).00 
0.09 
(0.00) 
0.12 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.61) 
0.13 
(0.00) 
-0.01 
(0.50) 
0.10 
(0.00) 
0.03 
(0.00) 
-0.01 
(0.18) 
1.00 
Notes:  (1) The correlations refer to the data on the 17,201 firms used in the regressions reported in Table 5. 
 (2) The log values of SIZE and AGE are used to calculate the correlations 
 (3) The figures in brackets are p-values.  
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Table 5: The Determinants of Export Propensity 
 
 
 Dependent variable: Export propensity (EXPRO) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
      
SIZE 0.306*** 0.307*** 0.310*** 0.306*** 0.309*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
AGE 0.199*** 0.192*** 0.194*** 0.199*** 0.189*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
FOREIGN  0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
PUBLIC  -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
WORK 0.015 -0.012 0.006 0.015 -0.015 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
POL  0.212***   0.199*** 
  (0.022)   (0.023) 
INF   0.107***  0.057** 
   (0.022)  (0.023) 
COR    -0.001 -0.010 
    (0.009) (0.010) 
Constant -2.514*** -2.950*** -2.737*** -2.513*** -3.032*** 
 (0.109) (0.118) (0.118) (0.109) (0.124) 
      
CFE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
IFE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
      
No. of observations 16,748 16,748 16,748 16,748 16,748 
Log-likelihood -6,058 -6,013 -6,047 -6,058 -6,009 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.167 0.174 0.169 0.167 0.174 
Notes: (1) Standard errors are given in parentheses. The asterisks indicate significance at the following levels: ***  
 p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
(2) CFE and IFE refer to country and industry (2-digit ISIC) fixed effects.!
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Table 6: The Determinants of Export Intensity 
 
  Dependent variable: Export intensity (EXINT) 
  Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
      
SIZE -5.734*** -6.275*** -6.244*** -5.549*** -6.675*** 
 (-1.439) (-1.653) (-1.489) (-1.434) (-1.687) 
AGE -8.315*** -8.350*** -8.035*** -8.268*** -8.122*** 
 (-1.385) (-1.456) (-1.406) (-1.420) (-1.517) 
FOREIGN -0.062 -0.059 -0.074 -0.055 -0.086 
 (-0.054) (-0.055) (-0.053) (-0.054) (-0.056) 
PUBLIC  0.226* 0.137 0.241* 0.218* 0.146 
 (-0.133) (-0.164) (-0.139) (-0.132) (-0.164) 
WORK -0.341 -0.767 -0.346 -0.206 -0.614 
 (-0.572) (-0.631) (-0.593) (-0.571) (-0.641) 
SKILL  0.067**   0.067** 
  (-0.029)   (-0.029) 
TECH   3.440**  3.474** 
   (-1.621)  (-1.670) 
MAN    -0.042 -0.092 
    (-0.065) (-0.070) 
IMR -24.287*** -23.906*** -23.426*** -23.065*** -24.958*** 
 (-6.115) (-6.275) (-6.002) (-6.083) (-6.414) 
Constant 107.824*** 108.921*** 108.436*** 106.315*** 112.798*** 
 (-16.854) (-18.538) (-16.885) (-16.767) (-18.926) 
      
CFE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
IFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
No of obs. 16,748 16,295 16,473 16,723 16,257 
Uncensored 
obs. 2,627 2,174 2,352 2,602 2,136 
Wald chi2 744.82 638.43 648.77 764.84 635.49 
Sig(Wald 
chi2) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Notes: (1) The model is estimated using Stata’s heckman command using the two-stage estimator. The row with 
“uncensored observations” indicates number of firms with positive export values for which the second 
stage is estimated. 
(2) Standard errors are given in parentheses. The asterisks indicate significance at the following levels: *** 
 p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
(3) CFE and IFE refer to country fixed effects and respectively, industry (2-digit ISIC) fixed effects.  
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Table 7: The Determinants of Export Propensity (Robustness Test) 
 
 Dependent variable: Export propensity (EXPRO) 
  Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 
     
SIZE 0.307*** 0.307*** 0.304*** 0.306*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
AGE 0.198*** 0.199*** 0.209*** 0.207*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
FOREIGN 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
PUBLIC  -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
WORK 0.013 0.016 0.013 0.014 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
POL_Alt 0.457**   0.551*** 
 (0.199)   (0.200) 
INF_Alt  0.132  0.200** 
  (0.095)  (0.095) 
CORR_Alt   0.545*** 0.584*** 
   (0.098) (0.099) 
Constant -2.522*** -2.536*** -2.535*** -2.580*** 
 (0.109) (0.110) (0.109) (0.110) 
     
CFE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
IFE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
     
No. of observations 16,748 16,748 16,748 16,748 
Log-likelihood -6,056 -6,057 -6,043 -6,038 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.168 0.167 0.169 0.170 
 
Notes: (1) Standard errors are given in parentheses. The asterisks indicate significance at the following levels: ***  
 p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
(2) CFE and IFE refer to country fixed effects and respectively, industry (2-digit ISIC) fixed effects. 
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Figure 1. Conceptual framework 
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